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Purpose – Community-based social enterprises (CBSEs), a spatially defined subset of social 
enterprise, are independent, not-for-profit organisations managed by community members, 
and committed to delivering long-term benefits to local people. CBSEs respond to austerity 
and policy reforms by providing services, jobs and other amenities for residents in deprived 
communities, thus contributing to neighbourhood regeneration. This paper aims to develop a 
better understanding of how CBSEs perceive accountability, how they apply it in the 
management and representation of their business, and why.  
Design/methodology/approach – Nine case studies of CBSEs across three European 
countries (England, the Netherlands, Sweden) are analysed, using data from semi-structured 
interviews with initiators, board members and volunteers in CBSEs.   
Findings – CBSEs shape accountability and representation in response to the needs of local 
communities and in the wake of day-to-day challenges and opportunities. Apart from financial 
reporting, CBSEs apply informal strategies of accountability which are highly embedded in 
their way of working and contingent upon their limited resources.  
Originality/value – While research has shown the complex governance position of CBSEs, 
their application of accountability to target communities and other stakeholders is unclear. 
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The paper coins the term ‘adaptive accountability’, reflecting a relational, dialectic approach 
in which formal, costly accountability methods are only applied to legally required forms of 
accounting, and informal practices are accepted by funding agencies and governments as valid 
forms of accountability, assessing CBSEs’ societal value in more open terms. 
 
Key words Accountability, social enterprises, community enterprises, self-organization, 
neighbourhood regeneration, hybridity, active citizenship, representation. 





Entrepreneurship is believed to improve the economic strength and innovation of countries 
and cities, but also of neighbourhoods and communities (Mason et al., 2015). However, the 
relationship between community and entrepreneurship is an under-researched topic in the 
literature, which emphasises individual entrepreneurs over entrepreneurial communities 
(Fortunato & Alter, 2015). Ronald Coase, the winner of the 1991 Nobel Prize for Economics, 
has defined the relationship between entrepreneurship and community as a new frontier for 
entrepreneurship research (Lyons et al., 2012, 19). 
 From this perspective, the rise of various forms of community-based entrepreneurship 
across Europe is relevant. Many countries have been implementing austerity measures and 
cuts in public policy, alongside trends of welfare retrenchment. Governments are putting more 
emphasis on active citizenship. Citizens are encouraged to take responsibility and organise 
themselves to fill in gaps left by funding cuts in health care, education, employment and 
neighbourhood governance (Healey, 2015; Kleinhans, 2017). There is a growing EU-wide 
interest in entrepreneurial forms of active citizenship, such as social enterprises (European 
Commission, 2014), for which there is increasing recognition of their important role in 
contemporary societal development. Spatially defined forms, such as community-based social 
enterprises (CBSEs) are described as a subset of social enterprise.  
In the literature CBSEs are defined as independent, not-for-private-profit organisations 
that are owned and/or managed by community members, and highly committed to delivering 
long-term benefits to local people (Pearce, 2003; Peredo & Chrisman, 2006; Somerville & 
McElwee, 2011; Bailey, 2012). Members of the community often form a legally constituted 
management board which may employ staff as well as making use of volunteers to deliver 
services. The concept of hybridity, i.e. pursuing a dual mission of financial sustainability and 
social purpose, is a defining characteristic of social enterprises (Doherty et al., 2014). Social 
enterprises (SEs) often span the boundaries of the private, public and non-profit sectors and 
bridge institutional fields, facing conflicting institutional logics. Combining these logics 
makes the governance and management of SEs a complex affair (Doherty et al., 2014; Spear 
et al., 2009). Apart from using (government) funding and applying for grants, CBSEs develop 
trading and non-trading activities in response to locally defined needs and by being responsive 
to opportunities in the local context in which they are based. Consequently, their hybridity 
goes beyond the dual mission of social purpose and financial sustainability, because the latter 
component implies a large diversity in sources of income and related financial mechanisms. 
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For CBSEs, the focus of this paper, the hybrid nature adds another level of complexity 
with regard to representation and accountability. In essence, “accountability is a relationship 
between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his 
or her conduct” (Bovens, 2007, 450). Whereas public institutions are usually accountable to 
citizens and supervisory boards, and market-sector business and enterprises are accountable to 
shareholders, this is not so straightforward for CBSEs. If they are owned and/or managed by 
community members, locally accountable and committed to delivering long-term benefits to 
local people, pertinent questions are to whom are they accountable? (cf. Wagenaar & Healey, 
2015, 558). What constitutes ‘community’ in the context of CBSEs? Many civil society 
initiatives, including CBSEs, are set up as charities, without any formal accountability to 
communities they cater for, but they may apply informal accountability, which is much less 
studied than formal accountability (Romzek et al., 2012). 
The preceding discussion raises the question how CBSEs themselves actually perceive 
the concept of accountability and how they deal with it in their daily practice. The importance 
of accountability is widely acknowledged, but is becoming increasingly challenging in light of 
the boundaries between various sectors becoming progressively more blurred and with many 
community business that are in a network of funders, local governments and other business 
(Connolly & Kelly, 2011; Williams & Taylor, 2013). With one exception (Buckley et al., 
2017), existing research fails to show how CBSEs, a particular type of social enterprise, deal 
with the challenges of representation and accountability. There has been little research of how 
such forms of citizen involvement might be integrated with accountability concerns, despite 
the large scholarly interest in both issues. 
 This paper takes up the call for qualitative research into organisational perceptions of 
and internal and informal mechanisms of accountability (Connolly & Kelly, 2011, 235, see 
also Bailey, 2012; Damgaard & Lewis, 2014; Hanberger, 2009). The paper will contribute to 
the scientific and policy discussion on accountability of hybrid, civil society initiatives, in 
particular those that aim to contribute to bottom-up regeneration of deprived communities in 
north-western Europe. We explore how nine examples of CBSEs deal with accountability in 
their businesses (Bailey et al., 2018). The aim is to develop a better understanding of how 
CBSEs perceive accountability, how they apply it in the management and representation of 
their business, and why they do so. This study looks beyond one specific context and explores 
examples of CBSE practice in three countries (England, Sweden, the Netherlands). While we 
do not aim to provide a structured international comparison, our approach reflects the growing 
importance of such initiatives across Europe. 
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The next section lays the theoretical foundation for the study by discussing relevant 
literature on community entrepreneurship and accountability. Subsequently, our approach, 
data and analytical strategy are introduced. The following sections report the main outcomes 
from the analysis of the case studies. The final section provides a discussion and conclusions. 
 
 
Community Entrepreneurship and Accountability  
 
The nature of Community-Based Social Enterprises (CBSEs) 
In the Introduction, we explained how active citizenship is framed as a viable alternative to 
state-based welfare provision that is reduced by austerity regimes and welfare retrenchment. 
Of particular interest in the current context are entrepreneurial forms of active citizenship, 
such as co-operatives and social enterprises. Like social enterprises (SEs), Community-Based 
Social Enterprises (CBSEs) generate a substantial part of their revenue through trading, 
relying upon ‘enterprise’ rather than government subsidy to finance their social objectives 
(Tracey et al., 2005, 335). While SEs are not tied to certain localities, CBSEs define their 
social purpose in relation to a specific population or sub-group living in a spatially defined 
area (Bailey, 2012, 4). They are also referred to as Development Trusts (Di Domenico et al., 
2009; Spear et al., 2009). Compared to SEs, the volume of work on CBSEs is limited, and so 
is the number of definitions. Based on the work of Pearce (2003), Peredo and Chrisman 
(2006), Somerville and McElwee (2011), Bailey (2012), Healey (2015) and Wagenaar and 
Van der Heijden (2015), CBSEs are defined as businesses which are: 
 established by people living and/or working in a (spatially) defined community; 
 independent, not-for-private-profit organisations, which are owned and/or managed by 
community members; 
 locally accountable and highly committed to delivering long-term benefits to local 
people, by providing specific goods or services; 
 seeking to generate a surplus through (at least in part) engaging in trade in the 
marketplace, and reinvest the surplus in the business and/or community;  
 bearing economic risks related to their activity, they are very committed to involving 





The goods or services delivered by CBSEs may vary from community facilities (shops, pubs, 
second-hand stores, recreational or health facilities), to community development and even 
affordable housing. Initially, CBSEs need to acquire funding in various forms (grants or 
loans) to start up their activities. Key to the functioning of CBSEs is that they acquire assets 
(buildings, land or other sources) to enable growth and income-generating streams to support 
their social functions (Di Domenico et al., 2009). In entrepreneurial terms, CBSEs look for 
opportunities and ‘niche markets’ where they are not in direct competition with private or 
commercial interests, or where there is market failure and clear evidence that the public sector 
is either unwilling or unable to provide a service. Many CBSEs are located in areas of relative 
deprivation which have been the subject of urban regeneration policies which have come to a 
full stop, creating both challenges and opportunities for CBSEs (Coatham & Martinali, 2010; 
Kleinhans, 2017). As such, many CBSEs engaged in community development and located in 
areas of disadvantage, face huge difficulties to be financially sustainable (Wallace, 2005, 85). 
 CBSEs rarely work in isolation but usually co-operate with local actors, building 
relationships with other organisations (Di Domenico et al., 2009; Somerville & McElwee, 
2011). CBSEs apply community development techniques that use both external actors and 
sources of support and assets from within the community. CBSEs can thus be considered as a 
type of co-production by focussing on voluntary involvement of service users in the co-
innovation of forms of public service delivery, responding to social needs (Osborne et al., 
2016). 
 
Accountability and representation in the context of CBSEs 
Accountability is a well-established concept in public administration, political studies and 
planning, but it increasingly also appears in community research. Basically, “accountability is 
a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain 
and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the 
actor may face consequences” (Bovens, 2007, 450). There are four important clarifications to 
be added to this definition (Bovens, 2007, 454-455; see also Mulgan, 2000). First, the ‘actor’ 
may be an organisation, but individuals may also be held accountable, either in a hierarchical 
way (e.g. ministerial responsibility in central government) or as an individual professional. 
Second, a forum is not by definition a single entity; actors may be “accountable to a plethora 
of different forums, all of which apply a different set of criteria”, creating the problem of 
many eyes (Bovens, 2007, 455). Third, conduct refers to the aspects about which information 
is to be provided. There may be legal, professional, political, administrative and financial 
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accountability. Fourth, the obligation concerns the question of why the actor must render 
account (ibid. 454-455). The relationship between actor and forum may be either hierarchical, 
in which the forum formally wields power over the actor (vertical accountability), or without 
hierarchy, with horizontal accountability to various stakeholders in society occurring on a 
voluntary basis (ibid., 460; see also Abouassi & Trent, 2016).   
 As mentioned earlier, the picture is far from straightforward in the case of CBSEs. If 
the CBSE is the actor and ‘the community’ is the forum, which people constitute this forum? 
Because CBSEs are established by local people and involve local residents as co-designers or 
co-producers of public services, it becomes impossible to clearly distinguish between “those 
who govern and those who are governed” (Damgaard & Lewis, 2014, 266). Moreover, CBSEs 
often co-operate with a wide variety of other actors, such as government agencies, charities, 
housing providers, NGOs and business, each of which may have different relationships with 
CBSEs. We need an understanding of accountability that demonstrates awareness of the 
relational context within which objectives, responsibilities and duties develop. 
“Accountability, from this perspective, is all about being responsive towards ever-changing 
stakeholder interests. It entails responding to these interests in terms of an evolving sense of 
moral appropriateness that has to be nurtured within everyday business practice” (Painter-
Morland 2006, 94). As such, accountability is not an activity restricted to defined moments in 
time but a dialectical activity, requiring a constant dialogue between CBSEs, residents/users 
and other stakeholders. In their study of NGO accountability, Abouassi and Trent (2016) 
concluded that various accountability relationships — and perceptions of these relationships 
— gave NGOs degrees of leverage to reject donor demands and potentially forego funding. In 
fact, NGOs may be more assertive about managing their institutional environments than is 
often expected on the basis of a resource dependency assumption. Apart from exit, voice and 
loyalty, NGOs can voluntarily and deliberately adjust their activities in response to changing 
donor objectives (ibid., 285). 
 Ebrahim (2005, 82) stated that accountability is “better viewed as a system of multi-
directional and contingent relations than as a collection of independent binary links. [...] 
improving accountability is not only about accounting for donor funds but also about making 
progress toward a mission that reflects accountability to communities”. This is a complex 
effort. Kramarz and Park (2016) found a paradox in Global Environmental Governance, 
revealing complex accountability mechanisms in response to demands for environmentally 
effective, democratically responsive governance, but the environment continues to deteriorate. 
Kramarz and Park distinguish between ‘first-tier’ accountability (design of the governance 
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institution) and ‘second-tier’ accountability (implementation of interventions). While the first 
addresses goals, actors and accountability fora, the second tier focuses on means, monitoring 
and evaluation. Accountability can only be meaningful for action if applied to both tiers, 
which are intrinsically linked (ibid., 8). The hybridity of CBSEs and their interventions (see 
the Introduction) reveals that they blur the boundaries between public, private and voluntary 
accountability. These ‘domains’ represent different, sometimes conflicting motivations and 
procedures for accountability, complicating the implementation of accountability 
mechanisms. 
 In the context of community-based organisations, accountability is interwoven with 
the concept of representation. In her seminal work, Pitkin (1967) identified formalistic, 
descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation. In brief, these types refer to the extent 
to which elected agents speak for, stand for, resemble or act for the people they represent, i.e. 
“acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin, 1967, 209). 
Michael Saward (2010, 10) has criticised this work for its “unfortunate tendency to take the 
represented as having a clear, readily accessible, and largely stable set of interests”. Instead, 
he defines representation as a series of events and “a process of claim-making rather than a 
fact established by institutional election” (ibid., 44). Saward sees democratic representation as 
a communicative practice that negotiates representative claims in various patterns. Generally 
speaking, a representative claim consists of elements in a circular relation: A maker of 
representations (M) puts forward a subject (S) that stands for an object (O), which is related to 
a referent (R) and is offered to an audience (A) (Saward, 2010, 36). The audience (A) not 
only refers to the constituency, i.e. the group that is considered to be represented by the maker 
(M), but also other actors (e.g. governments) that accept, reject or otherwise engage with the 
representative claim. In other words, the audience usually consists of various actors with 
different interests.  
 In a study of work integrated social enterprises (WISEs), Bradford et al. (2018) found 
that accountability is largely influenced by dominant stakeholders, such as important 
customers and funding organisations, which may have strict procedures for reports on outputs 
and impacts. Formal accountability was often directed to such stakeholders, whereas more 
informal types of accountability were applied to less powerful stakeholders. Other research 
has also shown that informal accountability is shaped by staff members’ individual and 
interpersonal values and actions, which are more discretionary and complicated and less 
transparent and studied than formal accountability interactions (Abouassi & Trent, 2016, 285; 
see also Romzek et al., 2012). 
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 Connolly and Kelly (2011) developed a framework to explore how accountability 
within social enterprises is constructed and discharged. The framework distinguishes between 
three basic forms. While legal accountability refers to implementing internal controls and 
complying with regulatory reporting obligations, constructive accountability is driven by 
moral, competitive or market expectations. It may apply outcome and performance reporting 
and may involve ‘best practices’ or setting standards arising from shifting societal values or 
political trends (ibid., 233). This helps social enterprises achieve legitimacy. Finally, 
voluntary accountability can involve “mechanisms to enable continuous improvement through 
training, self-evaluation and learning, perhaps arising from social audits and metrics such as 
social return on investment” (ibid., 234). While Connolly and Kelly (2011) consider 
constructive accountability as mostly reactive in nature, voluntary accountability is deemed to 
be more proactive. This latter observation is in line with a study of Buckley and colleagues 
(2017, 14) who concluded that “community businesses did not usually see community 
accountability as a distinct and separate activity […] rather it was embedded in their way of 
working […]. This included both formal and informal methods; required and proactive 
activity.” Hence, accountability in the context of CBSEs appears to include both reactive and 
proactive elements, connected to various methods and an array of potential stakeholders. 
This observation on the plural (and unspecified) nature of accountability has profound 
consequences for the organisational performance of CBSEs. According to Koppell (2005, 95), 
organisations may attempt to be accountable in the wrong sense, or, “perhaps worse, try to be 
accountable in every sense. Organizations trying to meet conflicting expectations are likely to 
be dysfunctional, pleasing no one while trying to please everyone”.  Koppell defines this as 
the problem of multiple accountabilities disorder (MAD). He offers five key dimensions of 
accountability – transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility, and responsiveness – of 
which the last dimension (responsiveness) reflects CBSEs’ mission to respond to local needs. 
The question is then how CBSEs deal with various conflicting needs and accountability 
expectations, and how the choice they make affects their organisation. 
 
Data, Approach and Methods  
 
The data used in this study was collected by the authors in the context of an externally 
commissioned research project. The authors were asked to review national and local policy 
parameters, to review sources and levels of technical and financial support for CBSEs, to 
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analyse practices of impact monitoring, representation and accountability, and to draw out 
more general conclusions about the development of the CBSE sector in England, Sweden and 
the Netherlands (Bailey et al., 2018). Considering that CBSEs are a relatively new, highly 
context-embedded phenomenon and a requested exploratory approach directed by a ‘how’ 
question (see Yin, 2012), we adopted a qualitative case study approach.  
The selection of initiatives (see Table 1) is not a random sample, but consists of case 
studies that generally reflect CBSE practice across the countries in terms of location, age, 
size, objectives and relationship to local communities. The choice of case studies was done in 
consultation with the advisory organisations partnering in the study, taking into account 
existing contacts with CBSEs and their willingness to participate in our study (Bailey et al., 
2018). Therefore, we make no claims about similar initiatives outside the experiment, or the 
representativeness of the case studies for other initiatives. 
 
Table 1   A Brief Overview of the Case Studies <see at the bottom of the document> 
 
Using a mixed-method case study approach, we have conducted semi-structured interviews, 
on-site observations and document analysis. In this paper, we only use the data from the in-
depth interviews with initiators, board members, main entrepreneurs, and volunteers in the 
CBSEs, as well as staff members of support organisations and state agencies. We visited the 
research sites multiple times. In total, 55 interviews were conducted in three countries (22 in 
England, 13 in The Netherlands, and 20 in Sweden), in the premises of CBSEs. We used a 
semi-structured interview guide with open-ended questions regarding the CBSEs’ objectives, 
organisational structure and networks, management, business model, representation and 
accountability, and monitoring. The interviews lasted between one and two hours, were 
recorded and afterwards transcribed verbatim for content analysis.  
We conducted a thematic analysis of the transcripts, based on a grounded, iterative 
approach suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). In this approach, several related themes 
of interest emerged in the context of the externally commissioned study and these were 
subsequently refined through the theoretical framework presented above. These themes are: 1) 
‘Community’, representation and legitimacy, 2) Dealing with formal requirements, 3) 
Informal practices, monitoring and impact measurement, 4) Questioning externally expected 
accountability, and 5) Leadership, board membership and accountability. Subsequently, we 
coded texts in the transcripts which corresponded to these themes. Finally, we analysed 
connections between emergent themes. The analysis of the transcripts does not imply any 
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claim of ‘authenticity’ or ‘verificational realism’ (Crang, 2002, Yin, 2012), but is able to 
unearth common and different experiences among the interview respondents. In order to 
safeguard their anonymity, respondents are denoted by their role in the CBSE only, leaving 
out references to specific CBSEs and locations (Table 1). During the thematic analysis, we 
found that the interviews with CBSE employees, Chairs and other board members contained 
the most useful information on accountability. In the next section the results are discussed. 
 
 
Results of the Interviews 
 
‘Community’, representation and legitimacy 
The social responsibilities of CBSEs lies in catering for the interests of their communities, 
based on ‘the principal assumption that community exists in a coherent form that has the 
power to demand accountability’ (Di Domenico et al., 2009, 988). However, the interviews 
clearly show that, in the view of our respondents, there is neither a coherent community nor 
an identifiable community demand for accountability in the case studies. Instead, many 
respondents ‘define’ the community in terms of local needs which need to be addressed by 
providing specific goods or services, regardless of whether these were formerly offered by 
government or welfare agencies. All case study CBSEs claim to know well what local 
residents need and that catering for these needs is a key source of legitimacy for their 
existence and performance. 
This approach towards accountability and legitimacy obviously affects the matter of 
representation. While CBSE respondents claim that they act for their target communities by 
addressing their needs, none of them stated that their organisation formally represents the 
locality in which they are based. CBSEs are aware that the informal processes they use for 
community engagement (see further on) are often considered by policymakers to “lack 
legitimacy because those who participate are not considered as representative of, nor 
democratically accountable to, the whole population” (Gilchrist, 2016, 15). In an attempt to 
avoid the traditional challenges of representativeness, in particular draining discussions with 
civil servants, CBSEs position themselves as (groups of) experts with local knowledge, (see 
also Richardson & Durose, 2013, 30). Several board members claimed that the legitimacy of 
their efforts is rooted in such local knowledge, through their own networks, local connectivity 




You have to live here to be on the board […]. It’s stability. Our Chair was born 
on the estate. Our board members are all recognisable to each other and we don’t 
have lawyers or other professionals to whom they would immediately defer. 
(Director)  
 
Using Saward’s perspective, the claims made by CBSEs can be considered as ‘representative 
claims’, except for the fact that they do not want the audience (beyond the CBSEs’ target 
communities) to consider them as formal representatives. In other words, all applied 
accountability strategies serve as a form of representation except for a dismissal of any 
recognition of the CBSE as a formal representative. Nevertheless, other organisations might 
still identify or treat CBSEs as representatives of the local community. In a few cases, this has 
resulted in contractual relations with the local authority, in which CBSEs are commissioned to 
deliver certain services as a result of being ‘close to the community’. 
Another aspect strengthening the legitimacy of CBSEs but which at the same time 
makes accountability a highly complex affair, is their platform function. We observed that 
several cases are attempting to better address local needs by facilitating and connecting local 
initiatives to make a stronger impact (see also Buckley et al. 2017). Even if they do not issue 
a representative claim as described by Saward (2010), the implicit message to the audience 
beyond the CBSEs’ constituency is that these CBSEs matter for addressing local needs, as is 
exemplified by the following quote: 
 
If you look at our CBSE, you can see that we have become a co-operation of 
various resident initiatives. Every time, we take responsibility to tie these projects 
to another, which enables us to do many things in the neighbourhood […]. I think 
the main strength lies within the connections between everything and everyone 
[…]. As a result, the local authorities increasingly recognise that we have become 
important, a very important local player. (Board member) 
 
Finally, the differences in understanding ‘community’ not only appear between actors on local 
level, but also between the three countries. The English and Dutch case studies place a strong 
emphasis on engaging with and providing benefits for local residents. In England, CBSEs are 
often initiated in areas with a long history of resident involvement in previous community or 
neighbourhood-based programmes. Dutch CBSEs often arise in target neighbourhoods of the 
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recently ended national urban renewal policy (Bailey et al., 2018). In Sweden, ‘societal 
entrepreneurship’ includes the notions of ‘community’, ‘community-based’ and ‘local’ 
(Persson & Hafen, 2014; Gawell et al. 2014). However, these notions are only emphasised in 
terms of settings in rural regions. In our case studies, which are based in Stockholm and 
Malmö, the local urban neighbourhood is not emphasized by our respondents even though the 
cases are contingent on their local context and have social aims for the community. 
 
Dealing with formal requirements 
All CBSEs produce annually audited accounts and reports to satisfy the formal accountability 
requirements of their legal status, as a company limited by guarantee (England), non-profit 
and economic association (Sweden) or foundation (Netherlands) as well as regular reports to 
funding bodies. This clearly reflects the notion of legal accountability as framed by Connolly 
and Kelly (2011). However, the interviews also revealed that some of the requirements 
associated with the CBSEs’ legal status are not always met. The Dutch CBSEs, for example, 
have the foundation (stichting) as the legal basis. This type of organisation obliges boards to 
establish by-laws (statuten), including arrangements regarding community accountability. 
Formally, the by-laws require CBSEs to have meetings with residents to discuss the CBSE’s 
objectives, activities and performance. However, this is a bridge too far in all (Dutch) case 
studies: 
 
Then you indeed need to organise residents’ meetings in which you give an 
account of your activities and plans, but hey, people in our neighbourhood are not 
interested in this at all! What we do, if we have resident meetings with a specific 
theme, then we include this accounting into the meeting, but as a very small part. 
In our newspapers and other publications, we are accountable as well, but to be 
honest, if you read what our by-laws say about how we should formally be 
accountable, we are not doing that. (Chair) 
 
This finding of a lack of interest in specific efforts to be accountable is in line with previous 
research on non-profit organizations (NPOs). In fact, project level outcomes for which NPOs 
can be held accountable “are typically so narrow that the public has no compelling 
accountability interest, e.g. training a dozen women in home business skills” (Campbell, 




In their efforts to meet formal accountability requirements from funding agencies, 
some CBSEs go a long way to show their public value beyond narrow, pre-defined criteria 
imposed by funding agencies. In a Swedish case, the Chair explained that the local authority 
used to only provide grants based on the number of hours that the community centre (which is 
run by the CBSE) booked for activities. In response, this CBSE increased the level of detail in 
their reports, to exhibit all CBSE activities and collaboration with other actors which are not 
reflected by the room bookings. According to the Chair, this has resulted a larger 
understanding of the overall activities in the community centre. 
In other cases, differing accountability demands associated with funding from large 
(national) funding associations have actually prevented CBSEs from applying for grants, as 
explained by one of the Dutch respondents: 
 
For every national fund, we have to submit a different format. All of them have 
different monitoring and reporting requirements. Why don’t these national funds 
[Orange Fund, Doen Foundation and VSB Fund] streamline their requirements to 
make our job easier? Now we have to plough through a mass of documents, and 
every time they ask for something slightly different. And each of them also wants 
us to structure our yearly reports in different ways. (Board member) 
 
Hence, the message is that even when grants are readily available for CBSEs, the associated 
accountability requirements may actually result in the decision not to apply for these grants at 
all, because CBSEs lack the time and staff capacity to deal with these requirements. This 
shows how CBSEs attempt to avoid ‘multiple accountabilities disorder’ (Koppell, 2005), by 
not engaging with conflicting accountability expectations that negatively affect performance. 
 
Informal practices, monitoring and impact measurement 
In its basic form, accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the 
actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his/her conduct to a forum which can pass 
judgement (Bovens, 2007). The previous subsections have shown that CBSEs are accountable 
to multiple fora with different sets of criteria, creating a ‘problem of many eyes’ (Bovens, 
2007, 455). With CBSEs operating on strict resource constraints, focussing on a variety of 
stakeholders can be problematic (Bradford et al. 2018, 160; see also Koppell, 2005). Formal 
practices of accountability by CBSEs are usually limited to specific actors (such as funding 
agencies) and specific actions, e.g. audited accounts to tax authorities. 
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In our nine cases, accountability is predominantly shaped through a range of informal, 
day-to-day practices, some of which will be discussed below. The interviews have shown that 
this is the result of a relational approach towards accountability. CBSEs’ mission statements 
require them to be responsive towards constantly changing needs and interests of local target 
groups and stakeholders and to continuously decide on appropriate actions and steps forward 
(see also Ebrahim, 2005, 2010; Painter-Morland 2006; Buckley et al. 2017). The previous 
subsection showed an example of how to integrate accountability into meetings with residents 
in a low-key way. Other examples of informal accountability are coffee mornings, door-to-
door consultation, community audits, workshops and feedback collected by volunteers during 
various activities offered by CBSEs. This reflects a wider trend among all case study CBSEs, 
who are experimenting with new forms of participatory democracy while conducting their 
core activities.  
However, many CBSE representatives reported that it is hard to keep up with 
dialectical activity and constant informal dialogue between CBSEs, target group and other 
stakeholders, let alone through formal accountability methods. As most CBSEs are 
predominantly run by volunteers, several chairs reported that their organisations lack the time, 
expert knowledge, staff capacity or other resources to be accountable in ways which are 
assumed or prescribed by bureaucratic actors. This particularly applies to CBSEs that conduct 
(semi-)commercial activities to raise financial resources in support of their social objectives. 
Similarly, monitoring and impact measurement are often not conducted formally and 
systematically. While respondents generally agree with the necessity to reveal CBSE impact, 
they perceive major difficulties such as the lack of commonly agreed methodologies, the issue 
of ‘additionality’ if working with other stakeholders, the question of when to measure if the 
project is continuing, and the factor that objectives might change. Instead, several CBSEs 
measure outputs in practical, low-key ways that are embedded in daily routines. Take for 
example, the monitoring of activities of one of the Dutch CBSEs: 
 
John and Frank are our full-time caretakers, who know it when problems arise. 
We [board members] consult them on a daily basis and we exchange during 
morning coffee meetings how the business is running, how things are going on 
and why (not). We have not established any procedures for this. In that sense, we 
are not researchers who systematically record as much as possible. That is not to 




Previous research has shown that formally established measuring tools, such as social cost-
benefit analysis (SCBA) or social return on investment (SROI) have been criticised as “being 
both too arbitrary for officials to find useful and too difficult for community projects to use” 
(Gilchrist, 2016, 35). Two respondents also observe that a more hands-on practice of getting 
feedback or showing impact works for their CBSE:  
 
We have actually stopped trying to really measure impact. We have tried many 
different methods, social accounting and SROI. We get constant feedback from 
residents. If we’re not doing it [asking feedback], we’re hearing about it from the 
residents. We use a community auditing technique and go out every 2-3 years to 
ask. We’re in the midst of a neighbourhood planning exercise which is an 
interesting experiment. We took the lead. We thought it would take 6 months but 
maybe it needs 3 years. (Director) 
 
I am fully aware of the availability of all kinds of tools to measure societal value, 
and I like that. And yet, we do not use these tools. I am really concerned with, let 
me just call it, showing the perception. We always try to show as much as possible 
what we do in daily life and practice here […]. What we are considering for next 
year is to issue a booklet portraying a number of people who tell what the CBSE 
means for them, and if you read that, you just know enough… Just telling the 
stories behind the activities and the people. (Chairman) 
 
In one of the Swedish CBSEs, the Chair of the board also acknowledged the problem of 
formally measuring impact, but emphasised the need for government support on this matter. 
Another potential drawback of (costly and time-consuming) formal assessment methods, is 
that they can lead to organisations which prioritise ‘analysis over action’, in an effort to fulfil 
top-down imposed accountability requirements (Connolly & Kelly, 2011, 230; Abouassi & 
Trent, 2016). This may be counter-productive for not-for-profit organisations which gain their 
legitimacy by ‘doing’ (ibid.). However, it appears that our case study CBSEs rarely get to the 
point where the balance of activities is tilted towards ‘analysis’ and accounting. 
 
Questioning externally expected accountability 
The finding that CBSEs generally refrain from formal assessment and evaluation approaches 
is often linked with a strong commitment to marketing themselves to the ‘outer world’. 
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Interviewees have emphasized the importance of telling their story, being transparent and 
communicating their aims and activities, to their target groups, but also beyond. All case 
studies rely predominantly on traditional methods of communication: newsletters, annual 
reports, websites, items in local newspapers, and themed public meetings (see also Bradford 
et al. 2018). Most CBSEs use social media to advertise their activities or special events. For 
many interview respondents, being accountable and transparent is often linked to promotion 
and marketing – stressing how the CBSE is stable, reliable and has a good track record and 
therefore helps generate support from larger, state agencies. 
Some interviewees have described this as public relations, image management and 
informing rather than accounting. However, others have clearly expressed how publicity, in 
particular the website and social media, play a crucial accountability role in accountability in 
projecting a positive image to all stakeholders – residents, funders, and others – as a 
mechanism to further the CBSE’s aims (see also Buckley et al. 2017). This is a clear example 
of the transparency dimension of accountability (Koppell, 2005).  
 
R: Putting reports and accounting online, of course we do, even though I doubt 
whether anyone will read it [...]. I think this is decent towards people who want to 
support us, that we are transparent on this matter. I hope this will evoke trust, 
maybe we have made mistakes, but that we, in any case, do our best to deliver 
everything in neat, responsible and decent way. 
Interviewer: So that you in fact … 
R: .. are accountable to the public. I think that the website, it may not be of much 
use for local residents, but I keep in my head that sponsors or other people who 
want to co-operate with us, that they may have a look at the website, that is what I 
would do. Then it is your business card, how you come across. (Board member) 
 
However, there are also critical remarks regarding external accountability by CBSEs. 
Many interviewees have argued that precisely because they provide locally needed services, 
driven by altruistic motives, they question externally imposed expectations or requirements to 
provide further justification for what they are doing (cf. Nicholls, 2009). This is in line with 
Buckley and colleagues (2017, 7) who found that “the term community accountability did not 
resonate with the 12 community businesses or reflect what they felt was a value-based way of 
working”. They conclude that “community accountability might be understood as the ways in 
which community businesses are embedded in their communities, engage local people in the 
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business and respond to the needs of their communities – be they hyperlocal, neighbourhood 
or a community of identity” (ibid.). This is a clear reflection of the responsiveness dimension 
of accountability (Koppell, 2005).  
While the previous interview quotes show an inclination to reach out to professional 
stakeholders, one CBSE prefers to minimise any form of dependence on and accountability to 
local institutions and professionals, but also residents: 
 
To anyone who wants to hear it, we tell our story. There is a neighbourhood 
newspaper, we have bought two pages in every issue, in which we explain what 
we do and how. But I don’t consider that as accounting, that’s just informing. If I 
am obliged to account to you, that will be legally established in advance. What 
really gets my goat if someone starts meddling with our policy and operational 
management. Strangely, civil servants expect CBSEs to allow them to do exactly 
this. We are a foundation, and that is no coincidence. By definition, an association 
with members creates a load of havoc. If you have one member that can organise 
resistance, a ‘trade union leader’, then you are lost. With an annual turnover of 
almost €700,000 we simply cannot take the risk. (Main entrepreneur) 
 
This position, which emphasizes the desire for independence of the business, is on the one 
hand at odds with definitions of CBSEs as suggested in the literature. While informing local 
residents is a clear strategy and adopted as such, this CBSE neither considers this as being 
accountable nor accepts any attempt from professionals or residents outside the board to affect 
the running of the business. This is probably an exception. The other Dutch and English cases 
show that assets, loans and attractive leases (of buildings) can only be accessed by direct 
engagement with the local authority. In fact, one English CBSE has a city councillor on its 
board who is responsible for developing social enterprise for the city council. In such cases, 
the boundary between representative and participatory democracy is becoming fuzzy. On the 
other hand, the above quote exemplifies an initiative that manages its institutional 
environment and resources more assertively than its comparative lack of power might suggest 
(Abouassi & Trent, 2016, 288). 
 
Leadership, board membership and accountability 
According to their general definition, CBSEs are managed by community members, implying 
leadership by community members. While the literature attaches importance to community 
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leadership (Selsky & Smith, 1994) that is structured democratically, our case studies reveal 
practices of leadership exhibited by charismatic individuals who propagate the core values, 
motivate volunteers, and make the majority of the decisions. Chairs (Sweden) and chief 
executives (England) operate within flexible management structures and wider networks 
through which they can build coalitions with other actors with “the added benefit of helping 
residents engage with and mainstream social and economic activity” (Coatham & Martinali, 
2010, 98). These leaders are often, but not exclusively, the initiators, or board members who 
were involved in the start-up of the business. In the Netherlands, leadership of the CBSE is 
sometimes provided by the Chair, in other cases by an entrepreneur (zakelijk leider) who 
might be an unpaid volunteer. Between case studies, there are substantial differences in 
whether board members are democratically elected or otherwise appointed. This obviously 
affects both internal and external accountability: 
 
We’re a democratic organisation so we’ve got a board drawn from the local 
community, the city council and businesses: seven residents, two councillors and 
two businesses. Anyone aged over 17 living in Stonehouse can join the trust. Any 
member can stand for election to the board. We have an annual general meeting 
in November and an annual election from the membership. It’s not easy to get new 
members, we’ve got a couple of vacancies. (Director)  
 
This quote also demonstrates a key problem in CBSE management. Case studies in all three 
countries reported difficulties in filling board vacancies (see also Spear et al., 2009). All 
appear to lack a succession strategy to ensure a steady turnover of board members. Elections 
rarely occur because few if any CBSEs have multiple candidates for board vacancies. Instead, 
board members are often recruited because of their skills (professionals), local knowledge or 
extensive networks (residents) rather than simply being resident in the neighbourhood. 
Experienced volunteers appear to be a good source of recruits for board membership. As one 
Chair notes, often the best outcome is to recruit board members who have specific skills but 
also strong connections to the locality: 
 
When I decided to take on the Chair position [and restart the organisation after a 
previous bankruptcy], it was like, we cannot have representations of members 
from local political associations. No reporting back and no engagement in this 
organisation. So we reappointed the ones [from the previous board] that were 
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really committed, but also key persons based on competence, skills, and different 
backgrounds. Yet, many of us that come from this area, so we are grounded in the 
local associations that exist here, all of us. (Chair) 
 
Unlike the Dutch cases, which are foundations that formally have no members, all Swedish 
and two of the English case studies are member-driven organisations. Both the members and 
the representatives of the board can be considered to be part of the target community of the 
CBSE. The democratic principle of ‘one member one vote’ is at the centre of the decision 
process which may also slow down the decision-making. One of the English CBSEs, which 
takes the form of a workers’ co-operative, has been reviewing its management structure in 
order to get a good working balance between leadership by a few and active involvement of 
all co-operative members, thus strengthening internal accountability: 
 
I’m a director of the company out of 15 co-op members and now a smaller hub of 
directors. We’re reviewing this and have to decide who will become directors. 
There were issues about the hub of directors making too many decisions. We’re 
trying to devolve down to the team level. We are shifting back to all members 
having decision-making powers, not just directors. The 15 includes anyone with a 
paid contract. (Director) 
 
Two of the Swedish CBSEs, also workers’ co-operatives, faced the delicate problem that the 
working members of the co-operative were not allowed by legal requirements to be part of the 
board because they were on social benefits when setting up the co-operative. One of these 
CBSEs dealt with this by establishing an ‘extended’ board consisting of these working 
members. This extended board has a weekly meeting where they meet and discuss different 
issues, thus ensuring internal accountability. The other Swedish CBSEs arranged for the 
working members to be appointed as co-opted members, to ensure working member input 





Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In the context of growing citizen initiatives, CBSEs are a particular entrepreneurial form of 
active citizenship. This particular form of community self-organization responds to austerity 
regimes and policy reforms by providing services, jobs and other benefits for residents in 
deprived communities, thus contributing to neighbourhood regeneration (Somerville & 
McElwee, 2011; Bailey, 2012; Healey, 2015; Kleinhans, 2017). CBSEs are owned and 
managed by community members, and are locally accountable in many ways. This paper has 
discussed how CBSEs perceive accountability and representation, how they apply it, and why 
different practices are adopted. Data from a qualitative, explorative study of nine CBSEs 
across three countries were used.  
 While “accountability is one of those golden concepts that no one can be against” 
(Bovens, 2007, 448; Koppell, 2005, 94), this concept, and the notion of representation are 
difficult to grasp in CBSE practice, for many reasons. First, CBSEs use different definitions 
of ‘community’, such as users/beneficiaries (Sweden) or residents of a defined area (UK), 
whereas others define it as anyone coming into contact with the CBSE (the Netherlands). 
However, CBSEs commonly define community in terms of local needs, whether or not in 
deprived areas, which must be addressed by providing specific goods and services. This 
approach provides legitimacy in different ways compared to state agencies and other 
institutions. Legitimacy of CBSEs is also grounded in perceptions of public value (Healey, 
2015, 22) and in CBSEs’ presence in local areas, acting as champions and facilitators of 
community initiatives, and having residents in their governing boards (Coatham & Martinali, 
2010, 98). At the same time, while CBSEs act for their target community through substantive 
representation (acting for people), they deliberately refrain from formalist representation 
(speaking for people) of the locality in which they are based (cf. Pitkin, 1967). From the 
perspective of Saward (2010), we conclude that CBSEs make partially representative claims, 
with the exception that they do not want the audience (beyond CBSEs’ target communities) to 
consider them as formal representatives. 
 The reason behind the dismissal of formal representation is, amongst others, connected 
to the second complexity of accountability in the context of CBSEs. Co-operation with 
multiple stakeholders confronts them with the ‘problem of many eyes’ - being accountable to 
different forums with different sets of criteria (Bovens, 2007, 455). With several CBSE also 
functioning as platforms for (other) bottom-up initiatives, local residents appear on both sides 
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of the ‘accountability equation’, as account givers and account holders (Damgaard & Lewis, 
2014, 265). Strictly distinguishing between these categories may be impossible. In an effort to 
serve ‘the many eyes’ and to prevent ‘multiple accountabilities disorder’ (Koppell, 2005), 
CBSEs both produce annually audited accounts and reports, and apply a wide range of 
informal, internal and external methods (website, newsletters, public meetings, social media, 
and storytelling). CBSEs thus publicise and evaluate what they do, with different methods 
being appropriate for different circumstances and different audiences.  
Third, the needs of target communities, the associated CBSE aims and co-operation 
with stakeholders develop over time. Hence, the ‘problem of many eyes’ is juxtaposed to the 
problem of ‘moving targets’. In line with other research, we found that CBSEs’ missions 
require them to be responsive to changing needs and interests, and adapt their decisions and 
strategies accordingly (cf. Ebrahim, 2005, 2010; Painter-Morland 2006; Buckley et al. 2017). 
In fact, CBSEs are more accountable to this process than to any particular constituent or 
outcome. With limited time, money, expert knowledge and (volunteer) staff capacity, flexible 
applications of accountability are a pragmatic way in which CBSEs’ can continue adapting to 
their changing environment, in order to survive and flourish (see also Abouassi & Trent, 
2016). This ‘adaptive accountability’ requires a relational, dialectic approach in which formal, 
costly accountability methods are only applied to legally required forms of accounting and 
informal practices are accepted by funding agencies and local governments as valid forms of 
accountability. The same applies to practices in which CBSEs ‘measure’ outputs and impact 
in practical, low-key ways that are embedded in daily routines. 
 Finally, ‘adaptive accountability’ appears in leadership. While CBSEs are assumed to 
have democratic governance structures, we have found that board members are often recruited 
because of their skills, local knowledge or extensive networks (with residents), or personal 
motivation (see also Spear et al., 2009). CBSEs are therefore often skills-driven rather than 
democratic representative-driven, and may fundamentally question the perceived need for 
board members to be democratically elected. In such cases, representation of the CBSE is 
‘secured’ through strong local knowledge and networks rather than elections. 
In conclusion, we have shown that CBSEs practice ‘adaptive accountability’ in 
varying, mostly informal ways which reflect pragmatism and continuous responsiveness to 
changing needs, circumstances and stakeholders, and which provides legitimacy. Using the 
literature on accountability and Saward’s (2010) concept of the representative claim, this 
paper contributes to the literature by revealing how accountability, representation and 
legitimacy are continuously negotiated as part of an ongoing dialogue between the CBSE, its 
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target communities and other stakeholders such as funders or government in all its forms. This 
study has shown that CBSEs struggle with shaping accountability in its various guises. Many 
CBSE interviewees argued that precisely because they altruistically provide locally needed 
services (which may have been disbanded by government, market or welfare agencies), they 
question frequently imposed external expectations to provide justification for what they are 
doing, beyond usual legal obligations related to funding or annual accounting and reporting. 
Moreover, accountability is often part of a marketing strategy to promote the expansion of the 
CBSE. This shows that both CBSEs and external stakeholders need to reconsider their 
definitions and operationalisation of accountability. 
Building on the social enterprise framework proposed by Connolly and Kelly (2011), 
we argue that adaptive accountability consists of a mix of legal, constructive, and voluntary 
accountability, including both reactive and proactive elements, connected to a range of 
accounting and representation methods and targeting a large array of potential stakeholders. 
As soon as CBSEs can effectively navigate all (legally) required forms of accountability, they 
need to develop mechanisms to “enable continuous improvement through training, self-
evaluation and learning” (Connolly and Kelly, 2011, 234). In the words of Ebrahim (2005, 
61), the challenge is “finding a balance between short-term, rule-oriented mechanisms of 
accountability and more long-term approaches to evaluation and organizational learning”. 
This is consistent with the argument for alignment of ‘first-tier’ accountability (design of the 
institution) and ‘second-tier’ accountability, i.e. mechanisms for accountability (Kramarz & 
Park, 2016). The latter need to match the design and management of CBSEs.  
We also conclude that adaptive accountability is reflected by how case study CBSEs 
purposively mix forms of representative democracy (e.g. board member election) with forms 
of participatory or deliberative democracy, by both engaging with local government decision-
making and experimenting with new forms of participatory democracy. Since CBSEs are by 
nature hardly ever fully independent from other actors, the discussion should focus on public 
interest and public value produced by CBSEs, in line with principles of deliberative 
democracy (Mulgan, 2000, 569, see also Buckley et al., 2017; Williams & Taylor, 2013). This 
matter is important in the context of increasingly fuzzy boundaries between various forms of 
democracy and associated issues of representation. If governments, welfare organisations and 
other actors consider CBSEs as an innovative form of co-produced public service delivery 
responding to social needs (Van Meerkerk et al., 2013; Wagenaar & Van der Heijden, 2015; 
Kleinhans, 2017), a more constructive approach, also towards accountability, is necessary. 
Effective and sustainable co-production is “not only a question of citizens assuming greater 
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responsibilities for the provision of welfare services, but also granting them greater rights in 
designing, commissioning, delivering, and evaluating them” (Pestoff, 2014, 398). 
There are, of course, limitations to this study. Considering that CBSEs are a relatively 
new, context-embedded phenomenon, an exploratory study design was appropriate here but 
this limits the external validity. In terms of future research, evaluating additional examples 
from Sweden, England, Netherlands, but also other European countries will help to build a 
wider understanding of CBSE practice in general and accountability in particular. 
Secondly, ‘adaptive accountability’ may have clear temporal dimensions. A nascent 
CBSE has to establish its presence and convince stakeholders, including the community, that 
it delivers benefits and therefore justifies support. Once this has achieved, it can build its 
reputation by publicising its services. As time passes, the CBSE may need to reaffirm its 
commitment to what it is and what it does by reaffirming (or adjusting) its core values (‘first-
tier accontability’) and seeking renewed support from stakeholders, using various 
accountability methods – public meetings, elections, etc (‘second-tier accountability’). Future 
research might uncover how ‘adaptive accountability’ unfolds across different stages of CBSE 
development. 
Finally, the limited body of empirical research on CBSEs in Europe leaves scientists, 
policymakers and citizens with open questions regarding impact but also how to ‘measure’ the 
‘public/societal value’ produced by CBSEs. Research should both unravel the concept of 
public value in the context of hybrid civil society, and explore how this concept can be 
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